International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Title:
THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREAND ABNORMAL RETURNS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN’S SMALL AND MID-SIZED COMPANIES

Authors:
WANG CHIEN JEN and LIOU YA YU

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WANG CHIEN JEN1 and LIOU YA YU2
1. Associate professor of International Trade Department , Takming University of Science and Technology
2. International Trade Department, Takming University of Science and Technology

MLA 8
JEN, WANG CHIEN, and LIOU YA YU. "THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREAND ABNORMAL RETURNS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN’S SMALL AND MID-SIZED COMPANIES." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 2021, pp. 1272-1282, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i04.010. Accessed Apr. 2021.
APA 6
JEN, W., & YU, L. (2021, April). THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREAND ABNORMAL RETURNS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN’S SMALL AND MID-SIZED COMPANIES. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 6(4), 1272-1282. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i04.010
Chicago
JEN, WANG CHIEN, and LIOU YA YU. "THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREAND ABNORMAL RETURNS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN’S SMALL AND MID-SIZED COMPANIES." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 4 (April 2021), 1272-1282. Accessed April, 2021. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i04.010.

References
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Abstract:
This study explores the correlation between corporate ownership structure and abnormal returns using Taiwan’s small and mid-sized companies as samples. From the empirical results, we can observe the relationship that exists between firm net incomes and abnormal returns, which exhibits a significant positive relationship. This indicates that, as the net income increases, the abnormal returns will also rise. Regarding the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights, the evidence revealed an insignificant but positive influence. This is expressed in Taiwan’s small and mid-size firms, wherein their cash flow rights and voting rights do not operate separately but converge. A positive influence indicates low cash flow rights, which closely relate to low abnormal returns. Meanwhile, we discovered that most of the small and mid-sized firms are family group companies. Their cash flow rights and voting rights are not exercised in a significant separate style.

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